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HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX — ANALYSIS USING 
COMPARATIVE METHODS 
The UN Human Development Index (HDI) measures poverty, 
literacy, education, life expectancy, and other factors. It is a standard 
means of measuring well-being, especially child welfare. The index was 
developed in 1990 by the Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq, and has 
been used since 1993 by the United Nations Development Programme in 
its annual report. The HDI measures the average achievements in a 
country in three basic dimensions of human development: 
 A long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth. 
 Knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate (with two-
thirds weight) and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross 
enrollment ratio (with one-third weight). 
 A decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita (PPP US$). 
HDI of European countries is showed in Table 1: 
Spatial Autocorrelation is correlation of a variable with itself 
through space. 
If there is any systematic pattern in the spatial distribution of a 
variable, it is said to be spatially autocorrelated. If nearby or neighbor-
ing areas are more alike, this is positive spatial autocorrelation 
Negative autocorrelation describes patterns in which neighboring 
areas are unlike. Random patterns exhibit is not spatial autocorrelation 
Indices of Spatial Autocorrelation: 
 Moran’s I 
 Geary’s C 
 Ripley’s K 
 Join Count Analysis. 
The Moran’s I statistics, a measure of spatial autocorrelation, is 
employed to estimate the phylogenetic correlation in a comparative 
data. Moran’s I coefficient is computed as: 
   i j i iji XW (),





ij mparison between location i and 
location j 
N is the number of cases
Xi is the variable value at a particular location 
Xj is the variable value at another location 
riaX is the mean of the va
W  is a weight applied to the co
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Source: Human Development Report 2004. 
Moran’s I coefficient usually varies between –1.0 and +1.0. A 
significant relationship is indicated by a value close +1; –1. 














Value typically range between 0 and 2. If value of any one zone are 
spatially unrelated to any other zone, the expected value of C will be 1. 
If value of any one zone are spatially unrelated to any other zone, 
the expected value of C will be 1. Values less than 2 (between 1 and 
2) indicate negative spatial autocorrelation. 
Moran’s I gives a more global indicator, whereas the Geary 







We perform calculation in Statistical Analysis Sy
***** **** 
* AUT . * 




VARIANCE  Z  P>|Z|  
RMALITY:  0.0316213 - 4.0900722  0.00002156 
VARIANCE Z P>|Z| 
ION:  0.0316213 –4.0900722 0.00002156 
r this test is less than 0,05, 





stem — SAS: 
***********************************************
OCORR.SAS — Spatial Autocorrelation Analysis Program
I and Geary’s C spatial autoco
* measures. * 
* Barry Moser, Dept. Experimental Statistics, Louisiana * 
* State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5606. * 
* VOICE: 504–388–8303 * 
******************************************************** 
SPATIAL AUTOCORRELATION 
N  XBAR  VARIANCE  V/M RATIO  KURTOSIS  
SUMMARY STATISTICS  39  0.86920513  0.00487433  0.0056078  2.49782721 
I C 
SPATIAL AUTOCORRELATION STATISTICS  0.61962017  0.27268784 
TEST OF I 
E(I)  OBSERVED 
ECTED AND OBSERVED VALUES  –0.0263158  0.61962017 
VARIANCE  Z P>|Z|  
T BASED ON NORMALITY:  0.01304743  5.65492703  7.79563E-9 
VARIANCE  Z P>|Z| 
TEST BASED ON RANDOMIZATION:  0.01318029  5.62635231  9.2030
TEST OF C 
E(C)  OBSERVED 
EXP 1  0.27268784 ECTED AND OBSERVED VALUES  
TEST BASED ON NO
TEST BASED ON RANDOMIZAT
A computed value I = 0,61962017, C = 0,27268784 indicates 
positive autocorrelation. We can reject the null hypothesis of no 
spatial autocorrelation. Since the p-value fo
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The presen emographic crisis in Ukrain btless, which 
is proved by as follows: 
1. Extreme he international scale ate and 
extremely high death rate that continues to grow, decrease of average 
life expectanc ulation; 
2. Natural the population, which was o d lately in all 
regions of the country; 
3. Negativ ion balance last 9 years; 
4. Annual n of population of the country by the average of 
400 thousand persons; change of demographic behaviour of the 
population, first of all of younger generations, transition to one-child 
and childless fa ystem. 
The demo is a disease of society, which requires urgent 
and effective treatment. Efficiency of any means and methods of 
treatment app epends on the correctness of the diagnosis that 
is upon the rig er to the question: what was the reason of crisis. 
The opinio e scientists upon the question divided. Some of 
them consider sharp decrease of birth rate in 90-s of year to be the 
result of cons  of economic and social crisis of the transition 
period and tha n as the crisis terminates, the birth rate will begin 
to go up. mic system and dramatic decrease of 
population lif riven by it, unemployment and other negative 
pro ion basic reasons of birth rate 
dec
ne». 
 by birth rate and mortality dynamics 
within the period coinciding with social and economic crisis (Figure 
1.) Indeed, the natural gain of population was observed in the country 
up to 1991 when it was replaced by natural reduction, which rates 
were catastrophically
200
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cesses, also were in their opin
rease, mortality growth which resulted in natural reduction of the 
population. This is the idea shared by the Ukrainian scientists, which 
have published the monography «Demographic crisis in Ukrai
This point of view is proved
 growing (from 0,8‰ in 1991 up to 7,5‰ in 
3). The level of birth rate for this period reduced by 40 per cent, 
and the death rate has increased by 30 per cent. 
The well-known Russian demographist A. Vishnevsky has another 
point of view. He believes that the true reasons lie in more complex 
system changes in procreative behaviour of 
fact that a lot of completely safe European countries have recently passed 
through the same ten years’ period of dramatic birth rate decrease, a
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here has it changed to growth (figure 2.). That is, that the t
particular countries, but they belong to global demographic process, 






































Figure 1. Birth and death rates in U raine dyna ics, 1989—2003, per mille k m
 
ountries m  Figure 2. The natality decrease in particular European c
(total natality rate) 
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And, eventually, the third point of view, whi
the birth rate drop
demograp . It is 
precisely
ch I adhere to, is that 
 and increase of m
ry of Ukraine in the second half of
ortality in 90s were caused by 
hic histo  ХХ century
 illustrated by the data given in Figure 3. The birth rate 
reaches the top post-war level in the late 50s. Since 1959 the first 
period of birth rate drop begins, that proceeds till 1969. In these 11 
years the coefficient dropped from 21‰ down to 14,7‰ (0,57‰ 
annually). 
 
Figure 3. Birth, death and natural growth rates in Ukraine dynamics,1950—
2003, per mille 
After the period of stabilization, since 1986 the second period of 
birth rate drop began. Between the beginning of the first and 
second periods 27 years have passed, that corresponds with the 
length of female generation in Ukraine. The second period 
proceeded for 13 years, and the birth rate decreased from 15,5‰ 
down to 7,8‰, with average per-year reduction of 0,59‰, that is 
approximately equals the level of the first period. It means, that the 
birth rate reduction in 90s would have happened regardless to 
external factors. The increase of birth rate in the last 3 years 
testifies to the ending of the second stage of birth rate fall and 
confirms the conclusion above. 
 169
ith some fluctuations. We will 
consider below the actual mortality state. 
The given data testifies, that demographic crisis in Ukraine began 
before the economic one! However depth of demographic crisis of 90s 
of the past and beginning ХХІ century cannot be considered examined 
separately from political and social economic processes, which took 
place in the country those years. Here it is necessary to point out three 
basic statements: 
1. The process of reduction of birth rate in Ukraine was considerably 
sped up by the drop of people’s living standards, uncertainty, multiple 
rise of prices for the entire assortment of children’s goods, growth of 
informal tuition fees, deterioration of women’s reproductive health. 
2. The economic crisis has sharpened the general negative 
mortality tendencies in the country. The quantity of deaths in 
2003 exceeds considerably the level of 1989, although the aggregate 
number of population reduced. If mortality in 1989—2001 remained 
at the level of 1989 the number of deaths during this period would 
2,4 million less. These are pure losses caused by mortality growth. 
increased in 1991—1992 was replaced by the same intensive outflow 
of the population. General direct migration losses of Ukraine in 
1994—2003 have exceeded 1 million people. 
Thus, it is possible to provide the following definition of the 
reasons of demographic crisis in Ukraine: «The demographic crisis in 
Ukraine is the continuation of the negative demographic situation that 
formed in the country in the 60-80s strengthened by political and 
social economic crisis of the 90s». What are its results and possible 
outcomes? 
In the post-war years the population of Ukraine was constantly 
growing reaching its maximum of 52,2 million in 1992, when its 
stable reduction began, which is illustrated by Figure 4. The 
number of population losses during the following 10 years equals 
to the population gained in 21 years before 1992. The number of 
population that was there at the beginning of 2004 — 47,6 million 
— is equal to the one there was by the beginning of 1972. Of 4,3 
milli on, 
and other 25 % are migration loss. This dynamics is presented in 
Figure 5. 
As for mortality, its rise had also begun long before the 90s crisis, 
namely at the beginning of the 60s, that is mainly connected with the 
population aging process. As one can see from the diagram, this 
process has been going on up to now, w
3. Transition process has brought important changes into 
migration processes. Positive migration blance that has significantly 
on general loss 3,2 million, or 75 % are natural reducti
 
Figure 4. The Ukrainian population dynamics, % to 1989 
 
Figure 5. The Ukrainian population  
growth formation 1989—2002, thousands 
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 of children before 15 years 
old
The deformation of age structure of the population became the 
second negative consequence. Comparison of gender-age structure 
pyramids of the population of Ukraine (Figure 6) built by all-Union 
Census — 1989 and all-Ukrainian Census — 2001 shows the reduction 
of birth rate in the 90s. If in 1979 the share
 was 21,5 per cent of an aggregate number of the population, and the 
share of the people over 50 years old was 27,9 per cents, in 2000 they 
were respectively 17,8 and 31,2 per cents. By UN scale the population 
is considered as old one, if the share of the people over 60 years old 
exceeds 7 per cents while and in Ukraine there are 14! 
 
Figure 6. Gender-age structure pyramids for population of Ukraine 
The modern demographic problems do not only have historical 
meaning, they also have long-term consequences due to the inertial 
nature of demographic processes. What are the possible variants of 
situation development? In demography as a rule three forecast 
variants are developed: optimistic, pessimistic and average. I shall 
concentrate on the one most probable to my mind. 
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Most probably, in nearest years the tendency for increase of birth 
rate will continue, and the birth rate coefficient will stabilize at about 
9 per mille that it is enough to maintain a positive balance of natural 
growth at appropriate mortality level. 
As to mortality its actual level and tendencies can be called 
catastrophic. Indeed, Ukraine has one of the highest, if not the highest, 
death rates in Europe. Our country holds the shameful first places in death 
rate by such reasons, as: blood circulation, breath and digestion, infectious 
diseases, malignant tumours, accidents including murders and suicides. 
Ukraine has such distinction in death rates for men and women as 
no other country does, which results in 11 years excess of average 
women’s life duration (73 years for women compared to 62 for men). 
First of all this is the result of extremely high men’s death rate in 
the most active age groups that is proved by men’s overmortality 
index presented in Figure 7. Worth mentioning that men’s death rate 
in most active age groups, from 20 till 50 years old, exceeds women’s 
death rate more than 3 times, sometimes almost 4 times. 
 
Figure 7. Male overmortality in Ukraine by ages (female mortality rate = 1) 
The increase of mortality gained such a stable tendency that only 
strong government  shows that such 
a tendency can bal experience 
shows mortality that is why the 
 and society can stop it. The reality
be kept in the nearest future.As the glo
 reduction is theoretically possible, and 
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mo
 we are going to 
face the further reduction of population and deformation of its age 
structure in the nearest years. 
I wish to illustrate the negative age structure evolution consequences 
with the statistical data of the Odessa region population. The Odessa 
region holds the 6th place in Ukraine and the first one in the South of 
Ukraine in population and it is typical for the southern region in 
population reproduction parameters. The changes in number and 
structure of the constant population of Odessa region in the second half 
of ХХ — beginning of ХХІ century are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
DYNAMICS OF NUMBER AND AGE STRUCTURE 
OF ODESSA REGION POPULATION 
out of them in the age of, % 
rtality reduction in Ukraine looks more probable than the increase 
of birth rate. 
It is obvious, that the main object of the state demographic policy 
should become mortality first of all. As for the birth rate, it has ceased 
to play a determining role in population reproduction. The reduction 
of death rate under 10 per mille is possible and that is proved by the 
experience of developed countries, while the increase of birth rate to 
10-11 per mille level is rather doubtful. Let’s also recollect, that the 
death rate in Ukraine till 1975 did not exceed 10 per mille. 
But even according to the most optimistic scenario
Year population, thousand persons 0—14 15—59 60 + 
1959 (on January 15) *  2026,6 25,1 64,3 10,6 
1970 (on January 15)  2389,0 23,5 63,3 13,2 
1979 (on January 17)  2527,9 21,0 64,3 14,7 
1989 (on January 12)  2624,2 21,7 62,6 16,7 
2001 (on December 5)  2455,7 16,8 63,5 19,7 
2004 (on January 1)  2419,0 15,7 64,8 19,6 
The characteristic feature of this period was the population aging 
proc
old share in the aggregate number of population. Evidently, in 45 
yea
ulation reduced by 
ess, which is determined by increase of the persons over 60 years 
rs it increased by 9 percentage points and now makes up one fifth 
of the population of region. The share of children for this period 
reduced from 25 to 16 per cent. The intensity share of children 
reduction amplified in the 90s, when Ukraine was in deep social-
economic and demographic crisis. While in 30 years since 1959 the 








 percentage points, it reduced by 6 percentage points in latter 15 
years. Meanwhile the share of able-bodied persons almost has not 
changed. During evolution of structure young age groups moved to 
the older ones through the able-bodied
Changes in population structure of the region during 1959—2003 
resulted in its deformation, which is presented by gender-age 
structures pyramids in Figure 8. In 45 years the population structure of 
the years has changed essentially. The significant reduction of young 
age groups and increase of the older ones is precisely visible in
amid. Actually during this period the transition of the population 
took place from the type between progressive and stationary with 
potential reserves for the extended reproduction to regressive which
 able to provide even simple reproduction. 
 
Figure 8. Gender-age structure pyramids for Odessa region populations in 
1959 and 2004 
The complication of demographical situation in Ukraine and in the 
sim
illu
Odessa region in particular which took place in the 90s resulted in 
ultaneous fundamental changes in population structure that are 
strated by pyramids for 1989 and 2004 years (Figure 9). In 1989 
the pyramid represented the classical stationary structure, which in 15 
years has transformed into regressive. 
 
Figure 9. Gender-age structure pyramids 
for Odessa region populations in 1989 and 2004 
Pyramids in Figure 10 illustrate differences in the urban and village 
population structure of the region in 2004. The pyramid for the urban 
population differs from the pyramid for the village population by the 
narrowed basis, which displays the lower level of birth rate in cities i
15 years. Besid  on th
population structure —  years age groups. 
n the last 
e urban es one can easily see the influence of migration
 expansion of a pyramid in 15—34
 
Figure 10. Gender-age structure pyramids 
for urban and village Odessa region population in 2004 
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0 % of a general 
pop
As mentioned above the factors, which determine evolution of 
population age structure are: birth rate, death rate, migration. The 
main factors of population structure changes in the Odessa region are 
birth rate and death rate, which perform over 8
ulation gain. Dynamics of birth and death rates in the region for 
1970-2003 is shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Gender-age structure pyramids for Odessa region populations in 
2004 and 2019 
It is obvious that in 30 years birth rate was permanently reducing 
until 2000, when the radical turn in tendency took place. In 4 years its 
level increased from 7,9 to 9,2 per mille. As for death rate, its level 
was increasing during all period with insignificant fluctuations. 
I have made perspective calculations of the Odessa region 
population number and structure till 2019. The forecast hypothesis 
assumes that actual fertility coefficients and age death rates remain 
c  
that the age structure defo ss that is the increase of 
people over 60 share and the decrease of younger age groups share 
wil
very 4  inhabitant of the region 
will be retired. 
onstant and there is no external migration. The calculations show
rmation proce
l proceed in parallel with the population number reduction (see 
Table 2). 
Compared to 2004 the population of region will reduce by 227 
thousand till 2019 or by 10 per cent while the share of children will 
decrease by 1,4 percentage points, and the share of the persons in the 
senior groups will rise by 3,7 points. E th
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Tab. 2 
NUMBER AND AGE STRUCTURE 
OF ODESSA REGION POPULATION IN 2004—2019 
Out of them in the age of, % 
Years Population, thousands people 0—14 15—59 60 + 
2004 2419,0 15,7 64,8 19,6 
2009 2360,1 14,1 66,1 19,8 
2014 2285,6 13,9 64,4 21,7 
2019 2192,2 14,1 62,6 23,3 
The evolution of the Odessa region population age structure in 
nearest 15 years amids for 200  
and 2019 (Fi
 can be shown by comparing the pyr 4
gure 12). 
 
Figure 12. Birth and death rates 
in Odessa region dynamics, 1970—2003 рр. 
 
The narrow a pyramid’s basis and expanded and middle parts 
confirm all stated above. The changes in number and structure of 
fertile age women and able-bodied quota are going to be the most 
negative consequences of the population structure evolution. The 
15—49 years old women will reduce by 17 per cent by 2019 in total, 
for 15—19 years old group — by 49, and for 20-24 years old group 
(most productiv  the previous 
period, th negative 
role in po
e age) — by 36 per cents. Unlike in
e age structure of the women will start playing a 
pulation reproduction. 
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 of demographical situation on our 
sphere of activity — higher education. I shall stop only on one 
aspect — formation of the entrants’ quota. 
Reduction of birth rate leads to reduction of scholars’ and school 
graduates quota, which are potential entrants of higher educational 
institutions. The influence of a demographical factor is strengthened 
by a social economic one, significant part of children of school age 
does not attend school. In 2002 their share was 18 per cent of school 
age children’s number. Only 60,5 per cent of 17-year-old boys and 
girls have graduated from high school and obtained the certificate. My 
calculations show that from 2005 the number of the entrants’ quota 
will start reducing that is shown in Figure 13. 
Comparing the estimated data with the number of the III-IV of 
levels of accreditation higher educational institutions of Ukraine 
entrants enlisted for the 1st year in 2002 (387,1 thousand persons) 
shows, that in 2008 numbers of the potential entrants will be 
already less than places available in higher educational 
i
 
379 thousand children of sc housand, or 11 per cent do 
not
The number of the able-bodied age persons will also begin to 
reduced gradually, though its share in the general population is 
expected to remain constant till 2014. The total reduction will make 
up 12 per cents, while the aging process of this quota begins — the 
number of able-bodied under 30 will decrease by 34 % in 2019. 
A few words about the effects
nstitutions. 
The similar situation is observed and in the Odessa region. Out of
hool age 41,5 t
 study at school. 65,2 per cent of the scholars finish school and 
receive the certificates. According to our estimations in the nearest 7 
years the number of school graduates in the region will change as 
follows: 
Table 3 
THE SECONDARY SCHOOLS GRADUATES QUOTA OF THE ODESSA REGION 
Year Number, persons 
% to the level 
of 2004 Year 
Number, 
persons 
% to the level 
of 2004 
2002 25427 97,5 2007 22872 87,7 
2003 25512 97,8 2008 22112 84,8 
2004 26080 100,0 2009 21011 80,6 
2005 25305 97,0 2010 19195 73,6 
2006 24160 92,6    
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The number of potential entrants will decrease permanentl
2005 and by 2010 wi pared to 2004. 
The problems of the population structure formation and its 
reproduction gional. Only 
state economical, social and demogr ficantly 
cha tual ng birth rate, n. 
But in ord  pess ally, I’d  remind ng: 
« e are mo ut peopl e immo  and express my 
con ence in the wisdom, understa ng and po l of both Uk an 
p  and author ich will allow them to f his crisis. 
E CONTEXT OF POPULATION AGEING 
IN UKRAINE: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION 
 
Introduction 
The research concerns the problem of sharp falling crude birth and 
fertility rates in conditions of stable population ageing in Ukraine. 
This paper presents the results of statistical analysis fertility in 
historical aspect and also the influence of some factors. It shows the 
cause-and -effect relationship between the fertility and population 
ageing trends. The results of imitative modeling allowed identifying 
the reproductive behavior of the population and its impact on the 
change of gender and age composition of the Ukrainian population for 
the near-term outlook. 
The phases of fertility trend 
Fertility does not only imply the reproduction of the population but 
also has a cons igher fertility 
leads to a high s the popula-
tio
y from 
ll reduce by more than a quarter com
parameters are national level problems, not re
aphical policy can signi
death rate and migrationge ac  situation regardi
er not to finish imistic  like to  a sayi















er a number of children i.e. it rejuvenate
le impact on its age-sex struct
n. Furthermore, a steady increase in the number of newborns to 
some extent strengthens the sex structure of the population in favor of 
males inasmuch as boys tend to prevail among newborns. It is com-
mon knowledge that the male age structure is mostly younger than the 
female one. Thus, even if fertility is maintained on a medium level 
and other conditions remain stable, it will counteract the ageing of the 
population. In turn, the ageing of the population adversely impacts the 
intensity of fertility as it engulfs the childbearing and potentially 
childbearing groups of the population. Hence, the ageing of the popu-
